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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since virtual currencies first came into the marketplace in the 
1990s, those responsible for monetary policy, federal anti-money-
laundering and economic sanctions programs, along with federal 
and state consumer protection regulators, payment systems 
operators, businesses, and consumers have grappled with 
understanding how these “currencies” work, whether they should 
be deemed “lawful” payment methods in the United States, and, if 
so, the manner and extent to which they should be regulated. 
Regulatory activity related to offering virtual currencies has come 
in fits and starts, with a burst of intensity in 2013 spurred by the 
attention to and use of a special form of virtual currency known as 
a cryptocurrency. 
This article reviews developments in 2013 that pertain to 
cryptocurrencies and their transactors and evaluates them against 
the backdrop of long-established and more recent federal and state 
licensure, payments systems, anti-money laundering, economic 
sanctions, and consumer protection regulation. It also touches 
upon transactors’ desires for anonymity and security in their 
transactions and related information and discusses how the 
technologies upon which cryptocurrencies are based may be 
adapted to support both other payment methods and electronic 
commerce in general. 
Part II describes cryptocurrencies in the market in 2013. Part 
III reviews the precursors to the current state of regulation in the 
United States, particularly the federal government’s prosecution of 
2
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e-gold, Ltd. In Part IV, we evaluate FinCEN’s initial guidance on 
virtual currencies, which it published in March 2013, and discuss 
industry reaction to the new rules. In Part V, we review recent 
actions by legislators, other federal regulators and some state 
actors. Part VI analyzes the federal government’s 2013 enforcement 
actions against Mt. Gox Co. Ltd. (“Mt. Gox”), and Liberty Reserve, 
which closely followed FinCEN’s March guidance. And, in Part VII, 
we ask—and make some modest efforts to answer—the core 
question: what does the future hold for cryptocurrency? The brief 
conclusion in Part VIII relies in part on the legal history of 
concepts of “money” and “legal tender” in the United States since 
1862 and concludes that it is unrealistic to imagine that 
cryptocurrencies will not face regulation in the United States for 
some or all of the purposes mentioned in this article. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
A. Cryptocurrencies Gain Attention of Regulators and Legislators 
In the spring of 2013 the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidance 
on the compliance obligations of virtual currencies under the 
federal Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).1 FinCEN’s announcement was 
quickly followed by law enforcement action, including seizure of 
assets of cryptocurrency participants held at banks in Maryland and 
California.2 In addition, federal indictments, accompanied by 
seizure orders, came down against the Costa Rica-based 
cryptocurrency known as Liberty Reserve.3 Also, the State of 
California’s Department of Financial Institutions issued a cease and 
 
 1.  Bank Secrecy Act, tit. I–II, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1114–24 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–1959; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314, 
5316–5332 (2012)) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations 
requiring financial institutions to keep and file reports that the Secretary 
determines have a “high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory 
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or 
counterintelligence matters, including analysis to protect against terrorism” 
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)(A)); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1000–1099 (2013) (FinCEN’s 
BSA regulations).  
 2.  See Part VI.A for a discussion of the seizures conducted as part of the 
enforcement action against Mt. Gox, an offshore bitcoin exchange. 
 3.  See Part VI.B for a discussion of the seizures conducted as part of the 
Liberty Reserve enforcement action. 
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desist letter to the Bitcoin Foundation charging the foundation 
with engaging in the business of money transmission without 
obtaining a license or other authorization required by California’s 
Money Transmission Act.4 The interests of federal and other state 
legislators and regulators have been piqued, and investigations and 
studies are underway on several fronts.5 
Cryptocurrencies have the potential to challenge government 
supervision of monetary policy by the disruption of current 
payment systems and the avoidance of existing regulatory schemes. 
In particular, they offer, or at least are perceived as providing, the 
ability to cloak transactions with a level of anonymity that is 
currently found only with certain cash transactions. Consequently, 
cryptocurrencies are of special interest to those who value their 
privacy, whether that desire springs from personal or political 
views, a desire to evade taxes, or for other nefarious purposes such 
as money laundering, terrorism, child pornography, or human 
trafficking.6 
Beyond these prospects, some charge that cryptocurrencies 
lack proper consumer protections, including consumers’ rights to 
prompt and full redemption of funds on terms specified in 
contracts that consumers have with entities holding their virtual 
currency.7 Additionally, cryptocurrencies are theoretically open to 
 
 4.  Jon Matonis, Bitcoin Foundation Receives Cease and Desist Order from 
California, FORBES (June 23, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/jonmatonis/2013/06/23/bitcoin-foundation-receives-cease-and-desist-order-from 
-california (describing and including a copy of the California Department of 
Financial Institutions’ cease-and-desist letter to the Bitcoin Foundation, May 30, 
2013, which references California Financial Code sections 2030 and 2151–2152, 
California Business & Professional Code sections 17200 and 17205–17206, 18 
U.S.C. § 1960, and 31 U.S.C. § 5330). For a discussion of the letter, see Rick 
Fischer, Obrea O. Poindexter & Matthew Ly, Bitcoin Receives Cease and Desist Order 
Evidencing Increased Regulatory Scrutiny of Virtual Currency, MORRISON FOERSTER (July 
18, 2013), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130718-Bitcoin-Receives 
-Cease-and-Desist.pdf.  
 5.  See Part V for a discussion of the state and federal initiatives related to 
cryptocurrencies. 
 6.  For more extensive discussion of these privacy issues, see Danton Lee 
Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 IND. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 38–39), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2317990. 
 7.  An example of such a consumer protection problem arose on June 20, 
2013 when Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange, suspended redemption in U.S. dollars for 
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use to transfer funds to persons who themselves are Specially 
Designated Nationals8 or to nations that are covered by one of 
many economic sanctions programs under the supervision of the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls.9 No 
wonder that they are attracting much attention from the United 
States government. 
B. Bitcoin 
Much of the recent media attention surrounding virtual 
currencies has been focused on bitcoins, due in large part to their 
extreme volatility, with prices for a single bitcoin moving from $13 
in January 201310 to $1242 on November 29, 2013, just a few dollars 
short of the price of an ounce of gold.11 Frequently described as a 
“cryptocurrency,” bitcoins have no physical presence and no 
 
two weeks. Press Release, Mt. Gox, Statement Regarding Temporary Hiatus on 
U.S. Dollar Withdrawals (June 20, 2013), https://mtgox.com/press_release 
_20130620.html. For a wonderful, early discussion of issues arising in connection 
with stored value and e-money in their infancy, see Task Force on Stored-Value 
Cards, A Commercial Lawyer’s Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis of Commercial 
Law Issues Associated with Stored-Value Cards and Electronic Money, 52 BUS. LAW. 653 
(1997).  
 8.  See Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2013). The preamble to the website’s coverage explains:  
   As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of 
individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on 
behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and 
entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under 
programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals 
and companies are called “Specially Designated Nationals” or “SDNs.” 
Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited 
from dealing with them. 
Id. 
 9.  For an explanation of the U.S. economic sanctions programs that the 
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control enforces, see Office of Foreign Assets 
Control—Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www 
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013). 
 10.  The Mysterious World of Bitcoin: Does It Have Staying Power?, WHARTON 
SCH. U. PENN. (Apr. 24, 2013), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the 
-mysterious-world-of-bitcoin-does-it-have-staying-power. 
 11.  Ben Rooney, Bitcoin Worth Almost as Much as Gold, CNNMONEY.COM 
(Nov. 29, 2013), available at LEXIS. 
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central authority in charge of the money supply, but instead, they 
rely upon a peer-to-peer network of participants to maintain a huge 
database of valid bitcoins used to verify transactions.12 Each bitcoin 
is in essence a chain of digital signatures which, when decoded, 
provide the entire transactional history of the bitcoin.13 The 
members of the network who verify new transactions, a process 
involving intense mathematical computations, are called “miners” 
and are rewarded for their service with additional bitcoins.14 
The number of bitcoins slowly expands over time, but will 
reach a pre-announced limit of twenty-one million around the year 
2040.15 The supply of bitcoin “money” is not controlled by any 
government or central authority and cannot be manipulated for 
political purposes—a definite advantage to the currency in the eyes 
of some.16 Bitcoin is frequently described as anonymous, because 
while every transaction is recorded in the public “block chain,” 
parties are identified only by a bitcoin address.17 It is possible to 
trace transactions although it may be difficult to associate a 
transaction with a particular individual.18 To obtain bitcoins, you 
either need to be a “miner” or you must purchase them on a 
currency exchange.19 Users keep their bitcoins in a wallet, which is 
stored either in the cloud or on their personal computer.20 
Bitcoins may be used to make purchases from a growing 
number of merchants,21 although the currency is still strongly 
 
 12.  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 21 (Oct. 2012), 
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes 
201210en.pdf.  
 13.  Id. at 23. 
 14.  Id. at 23–24. 
 15.  Id. at 24−25 (explaining that the bitcoin protocol was designed to allow 
for the money supply to increase at a predictable pace, without the possibility of 
intervention by a central authority, in order to prevent inflation). 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  See Nicole Perlroth, Unlike Liberty Reserve, Bitcoin Is Not Anonymous—Yet, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2013), 2013 WLNR 13121843. 
 18.  Andy Greenberg, Follow the Bitcoins: How We Got Busted Buying Drugs on 
Silk Road’s Black Market, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/09/05/follow-the-bitcoins-how-we-got-busted 
-buying-drugs-on-silk-roads-black-market; Perlroth, supra note 17.  
 19.  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 12, at 21, 24. 
 20.  Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST.COM (June 13, 2011, 8:30 PM), 
available at Westlaw. 
 21.  Bailey Reutzel, Why Some Merchants Accept Bitcoin Despite the Risks, 
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suspected of being associated with underground and illegal 
transactions.22 In particular, it was the payment mechanism of 
choice on Silk Road, an online marketplace for drugs, erotica, fake 
IDs, and other illegal goods23 before the government shut down the 
website.24 Despite its current bad-boy reputation, traditional 
bankers have taken notice of bitcoin and are working on 
integrating it into more mainstream financial services.25 Companies 
that provide bitcoin-related products and services—things like 
currency exchanges, wallets, mining equipment, and software—are 
also garnering attention from venture capitalists and other 
investors.26 
C. Other Cryptocurrencies 
Bitcoin may be the media darling of the moment, but it is not 
the only virtual currency in existence. Other cryptocurrencies such 
as Litecoin, GeistGeld, SolidCoin, BBQcoin, and PPCoin are 
similar in nature to Bitcoin but claim to offer technological 
improvements that will make them faster, safer, or more con-
venient than Bitcoin.27 A modified version of the Bitcoin protocol 
 
PAYMENTS SOURCE (May 21, 2013, 4:00 AM), available at LEXIS. 
 22.  Arwa Mahdawi, Bitcoin: More Than Just the Currency of Digital Vice, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2013), 2013 WLNR 5318040.  
 23.  James Ball, Silk Road: The Online Drug Marketplace That Officials Seem 
Powerless to Stop, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2013, 12:04 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/world/2013/mar/22/silk-road-online-drug-marketplace. 
 24.  Andy Greenberg, End of the Silk Road: FBI Says It’s Busted the Web’s Biggest 
Anonymous Drug Black Market, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/10/02/end-of-the-silk-road-fbi-busts-the 
-webs-biggest-anonymous-drug-black-market. 
 25.  See Marc Hostein, Lightning Fast, Dirt Cheap: Bitcoin Shows What Banking 
Could Be, AM. BANKER (Aug. 24, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.americanbanker 
.com/bankthink/lightning-fast-dirt-cheap-bitcoin-shows-what-banking-could-be 
-1052108-1.html; Jon Matonis, Bitcoin on the PayPal Network, FORBES (May 4, 2013, 
10:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2013/05/04/bitcoin-on-the 
-paypal-network.  
 26.  Stacey Cowly, The Winklevoss Twins Are Bitcoin Bulls, CNNMONEY.COM 
(May 18, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/18/investing 
/winklevoss-bitcoin/index.html; Jon Matonis, New Bitcoin VC Fund Seeks Edge with 
Regulatory, Security Skills, AM. BANKER (May 29, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www 
.americanbanker.com/bankthink/new-bitcoin-vc-fund-seeks-edge-with-regulatory 
-security-skills-1059453-1.html. 
 27.  See Andrew R. Johnson, Promise and Peril of Virtual Currencies, WALL ST. J., 
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with enhancements to support increased anonymity, dubbed 
“Bitcoin 2,” also has been proposed.28 The rise of these so called 
“altcoins”29 has been criticized by some as detrimental to 
cryptocurrencies30 and doomed to failure.31 In addition, virtual 
currencies like Liberty Reserve, WebMoney, Perfect Money, and 
CashU are designed to be totally anonymous,32 although only time 
will tell whether such claims are true. These services are typically 
based outside of the United States, do little or nothing to verify the 
identity of their customers, and do not accept payment directly but 
require users to go through a third party to buy or sell their 
currency.33 
D. Other Virtual Currencies 
In addition to the products discussed above, there are virtual 
currencies in the market that do not rely on cryptography. The 
online role-playing game Second Life created by Linden Labs has 
been around since 2003 and allows players to participate in a 
virtual economy based on Linden Dollars.34 Whereas Bitcoin lacks a 
central monetary authority, Second Life maintains control over its 
 
May 29, 2013, at C2, available at LEXIS; Tom Simonite, Bitcoin Isn’t the 
Only Cryptocurrency in Town, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www 
.technologyreview.com/news/513661/bitcoin-isnt-the-only-cryptocurrency-in 
-town. 
 28.  Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin Activists Propose Hard Fork to Bitcoin to Keep It 
Anonymous and Regulation-Free, COINDESK (July 25, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://www 
.coindesk.com/bitcoin-activists-suggest-hard-fork-to-bitcoin-to-keep-it-anonymous 
-and-regulation-free. 
 29.  A listing of altcoins can be found at List of Alternative Cryptocurrencies, 
BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/List_of_alterantive_cryptocurrencies (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2013). Some commentators recognize Ripple as an “altcoin” and 
others do not. The cited list does not recognize Ripple as an altcoin, conceiving of 
Ripple more like a different payment system with similar concepts operating in a 
closed-source, centralized nature. See id. 
 30.  David Gilson, MasterCoin to Create New Altcoins in Bitcoin’s Block Chain, 
COINDESK (Aug. 25, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/mastercoin-to 
-create-new-altcoins-in-bitcoins-block-chain. 
 31.  Daniel Krawisz, The Problem with Altcoins, MISES CIRCLE (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://themisescircle.org/blog/2013/08/22/the-problem-with-altcoins. 
 32.  Nicole Perlroth, Anonymous Payment Schemes Thriving on Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 29, 2013, at B1, available at 2013 WLNR 13235067. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 12, at 28–29. 
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currency through a variety of mechanisms.35 Players who earn a 
profit selling virtual land and goods to other players can even 
convert their Linden Dollars back into real money.36 
In 2010, Facebook announced its virtual currency called 
Facebook Credits, which would facilitate payments in games and 
apps operating on the site.37 Within two years, however, it 
abandoned the virtual currency38 and is facing a class action lawsuit 
brought by parents of children who purchased Facebook Credits 
without parental consent.39 
Although Facebook may be retreating, Amazon is marching 
forward, announcing Amazon Coins, a virtual currency for use on 
the company’s Kindle Fire tablets.40 Commentators are already 
criticizing Amazon Coins as being of limited value to consumers,41 
but that has not stopped Amazon from filing for a patent on its 
digital currency.42 
In an interesting twist, the founder of the failed virtual 
currency e-gold43 is involved in efforts to launch a new virtual 
currency backed by reserves of gold.44 
 
 35.  Id. at 29. 
 36.  Id.; Michael S. Rosenwald, In the Virtual World, Making Actual Millions; 
Online Entrepreneurs Meet Avatars’ Needs as Well as Their Own, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 
2010, at A01, available at 2010 WLNR 26708271. 
 37.  Dean Takahashi, How Facebook Plans to Fuel the App Economy with Facebook 
Credits, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 21, 2010, 3:18 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2010/04 
/21/how-facebook-plans-to-fuel-the-app-economy-with-facebook-credits. 
 38.  Tim Peterson, Facebook Gives Up on Facebook Credits, ADWEEK 
(June 20, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/facebook 
-gives-facebook-credits-141237.  
 39.  Tom Cheredar, Can Minors Buy Facebook Credits? Parents Demand Refund in 
Class Action Suit, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 20, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://venturebeat.com 
/2012/04/20/facebook-credits-minors.  
 40.  Bailey Reutzel, Amazon Advances in Virtual Money Battle While Facebook 
Retreats, AM. BANKER (Feb. 11, 2013), 2013 WLNR 3209781. 
 41.  Lee Hutchinson, Amazon’s New “Virtual Currency” of Dubious Benefit 
to Customers, ARS TECHNICA (May 13, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://arstechnica.com 
/business/2013/05/amazons-new-virtual-currency-of-dubious-benefit-to 
-customers.  
 42.  Amazon Applies for Patent on Digital Currency, PAYMENTS J. (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://paymentsjournal.com/Content/Featured_Stories/16200. 
 43.  e-gold is discussed in depth in Part III, infra. 
 44.  Stephen Foley, E-gold Founder Backs New Bitcoin Rival, FIN. TIMES 
(London) (Nov. 28, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f7488616-561a 
-11e3-96f5-00144feabdc0.html; see also Stephen Foley, Bitcoin Needs to Learn from 
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III. PRECURSORS TO REGULATION—THE GOVERNMENT’S 
PROSECUTION OF E-GOLD 
While recent interest in cryptocurrencies has been sparked by 
Bitcoin and related products, law enforcement first took notice of 
virtual currencies back in 2007 when the federal government 
charged e-gold, Ltd. and its owners with violating federal and state 
laws regarding “money transmission” services. This section of this 
article describes the e-gold, Ltd. business model, the criminal 
prosecution of the company, and the current status of the company 
and its assets. In addition, the section critiques the application of 
“money transmission” laws to e-gold and discusses what the court’s 
decision may mean for cryptocurrencies. 
A. e-gold, Ltd. Built a Successful Business Facilitating Internet 
Payments45 
Before it was effectively shut down by law enforcement, e-gold, 
Ltd. was an Internet-based system that allowed individuals to make 
domestic and international payments denominated not in dollars 
or pounds or euros, but rather in gold and other precious metals.46 
e-gold promoted its product as unique because “every ounce is 
secured by actual gold bullion held in allocated storage at 
repositories certified by the London Bullion Market Association.”47 
Title to the bullion was held by the e-gold Bullion Reserve Special 
Purpose Trust for the exclusive benefit of holders of e-gold, e-silver, 
e-platinum, and e-palladium.48 In 1999, the Financial Times 
described e-gold as “the only electronic currency that has achieved 
 
Past E-Currency Failures, FIN. TIMES (London) (Nov. 28, 2013, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6d51117e-5806-11e3-a2ed-00144feabdc0.html. 
 45.  Part III.A is derived in part from an article previously published by the 
authors. See Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook & Broox W. Peterson, 
Developments in the Law Concerning Stored-Value Cards and Other Electronic Payments 
Products, 63 BUS. LAW. 237, 255–57 (2007). 
 46.  See generally, Kim Zetter, Bullion and Bandits: The Improbable Rise and Fall of 
E-Gold, WIRED (June 9, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009 
/06/e-gold/. 
 47.  Defendants’ Status Report and Notice of Compliance with This Court’s 
Seizure Warrants and Post-Indictment Restraining Order at 6, United States v. 
e-gold, Ltd., No. 07-109-RMC (D.D.C. May 17, 2007), ECF No. 28, available at 
http://cryptome.org/e-gold/028.pdf. 
 48.  Id. 
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critical mass on the web. . . . For merchants, [e-gold] has a further 
bonus: unlike credit cards, which are liable to charge backs, the 
system guarantees payment once ordered.”49 Early write-ups in 
magazines such as Barron’s50 and Wired 51 gave e-gold both visibility 
and credibility. 
B. The United States Government Indictment against e-gold for Money 
Laundering and Other Offenses52 
On April 24, 2007, a federal grand jury in the District of 
Columbia handed down a four-count indictment against e-gold, 
Ltd; its affiliate Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.; and their owners, 
Dr. Douglas L. Jackson, Reid Jackson, and Barry K. Downey.53 
The government alleged that “[e-gold] has been a highly favored 
method of payment by operators of investment scams, credit card 
and identity fraud, and sellers of online child pornography,” and 
that e-gold facilitated its customers’ payments “knowing that the 
funds involved were the proceeds of unlawful activity.”54 
Count one of the indictment charged the defendants with 
transmitting monetary instruments or funds involving the proceeds 
of illegal activity with the intent of promoting that illegal activity, 
 
 49.  Tim Jackson, When Gold Makes Cents, FIN. TIMES (London), July 13, 1999, 
at 18.  
 50.  Jack White & Doug Ramsey, Making New Money, BARRON’S, Apr. 23, 2001, 
at 59, available at LEXIS (“With the global explosion of the Internet and 
e-commerce, the world needs a new type of currency. It needs an asset-backed, 
high-tech monetary standard, without the political machinations that hobble the 
euro, the dollar, the yen and all other traditional currencies. . . . One company, 
[e]-gold, already allows online users to settle payments using its currency, which is 
100% backed by gold.”). 
 51.  Julian Dibbell, In Gold We Trust, WIRED (Jan. 2002), http:// 
www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.01/egold.html (“Invulnerable to government 
manipulation and subject to the kinds of market forces only a worldwide, 24/7, 
open-ended network can bring to bear, e-gold promises not simply better money 
but the best: a money supply kept so straight and narrow that it has room for 
neither bubbles nor crashes.”). 
 52.  The first four paragraphs of Part III.B are derived from an article 
previously published by the authors. See Hughes et al., supra note 45, at 257–59.  
 53.  Indictment at 1, United States v. e-gold, Ltd., No. 07-109 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 
2007), 2007 WL 2988241 [hereinafter “e-gold Indictment”]. 
 54.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-Gold Indicted 
for Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting (Apr. 27, 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_301.html. 
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knowing that the transactions were designed to conceal the source 
of the proceeds of the illegal activity.55 At issue were transfers of 
e-gold from one account to another that the government alleged 
facilitated the sale of child pornography, stolen credit and debit 
card information, and various types of investment fraud, such as 
Ponzi schemes and illegal high-yield investment programs.56 The 
indictment identified thirty-six specific e-gold transactions taking 
place between August 2000 and December 2005 with dollar values 
ranging from $40 to $725,000 that the government asserted were 
made in support of such illegal activity.57 
The remaining three counts of the indictment alleged that 
e-gold operated as a money transmitter without an appropriate 
state license, failed to comply with federal money transmitter 
regulations, and transmitted funds known to have been derived 
from a criminal offense.58 According to the government, e-gold 
failed to obtain a money transmitter’s license in the District of 
Columbia,59 as is required by law.60 Prosecutors further alleged that 
e-gold ignored federal requirements to implement an anti-money-
laundering program61 and to file Suspicious Activity Reports with 
the Treasury.62 The indictment alleged that e-gold failed to verify 
the identity of its customers,63 allowed accounts with obviously 
bogus names such as “Mickey Mouse” and “Anonymous Man,”64 
hired employees with no experience in financial services and 
provided them with little or no training,65 allowed transactions with 
suspicious notations such as “child porn” and “CC fraud,” and did 
little or nothing to stop transactions tied to illegal behavior.66 As 
 
 55.  e-gold Indictment, supra note 53, ¶ 29 (alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1957). 
 56.  Id. ¶¶ 23–26. 
 57.  Id. ¶¶ 42–47. 
 58.  Id. ¶ 50.  
 59.  Id. ¶ 68. 
 60.  See id. at 26 (citing D.C. CODE § 26-1001(10)).  
 61.  Id. ¶ 11 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) and its implementing regulations, 31 
C.F.R. § 103.125). 
 62.  Id. ¶ 12 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) in conjunction with 31 C.F.R. 
§ 103.20 (current version at 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320 (2013))). 
 63.  Id. ¶ 31. 
 64.  Id. ¶¶ 20–21. 
 65.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 66.  Id. ¶¶ 34–35. 
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well as being independent violations of the law, these offenses 
constituted criminal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1960.67 
In August 2007, the federal court ordered the seizure of all of 
the assets of e-gold, including bank accounts, precious metals, and 
accounts receivable both in the United States and abroad.68 
Subsequently, e-gold entered into a plea agreement resolving the 
charges against it.69 Its remaining assets are being distributed to 
users under a court-approved plan.70 
Prior to entering into the plea agreement, defendants 
unsuccessfully sought to have most of the indictment dismissed, 
asserting the government had failed to allege adequate facts to 
support the charges.71 Defendants’ primary argument was the 
statute they were charged under, 18 U.S.C. § 1960, applied only to 
a “money transmitting business” and that in order to be a money 
transmitting business an entity must engage in cash transactions.72 
They argued that because they do not deal in cash, the indictment 
must be dismissed.73 The court rejected e-gold’s argument, 
concluding, “Section 1960 defines what it means to be unlicensed 
and what it means to engage in money transmitting. By those 
definitions, a business can clearly engage in money transmitting 
without limiting its transactions to cash or currency and would 
commit a crime if it did so without being licensed.”74 The court 
read § 1960 as providing an expansive definition of money 
transmission: “Section 1960 defines ‘money transmitting’ broadly to 
 
 67.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly conducts, controls, 
manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an unlicensed money 
transmitting business, shall be fined in accordance with this title or imprisoned 
not more than 5 years, or both.”). 
 68.  Post-Indictment Restraining Order at 3–4, United States v. e-gold, Ltd., 
No. 07-109 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2007), ECF No. 33, available at http://ia600202 
.us.archive.org/16/items/gov.uscourts.dcd.125293/gov.uscourts.dcd.125293.33.0 
.pdf. 
 69.  Plea Agreement of e-gold, Ltd., United States v. e-gold, Ltd., No. 07-109-
01 (D.D.C. July 21, 2008), 2008 WL 4234436. 
 70.  See Douglas Jackson, e-gold Value Access Plan Overview, E-GOLD BLOG 
(Aug. 12, 2011, 7:45 PM), http://blog.e-gold.com/2011/08/vap-overview.html. 
 71.  e-gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
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including transferring ‘funds,’ not just currency, by ‘any and all 
means;’ it is not limited to cash transactions.”75 
Defendants argued that within federal law, the term “money 
transmitting business” is only defined at 31 U.S.C. § 5330, which 
provides that a business can be considered a “money transmitting 
business” only if it is required to file cash transaction reports under 
31 U.S.C. § 5313.76 Section 5313, in turn, places a reporting 
requirement only upon domestic financial institutions involved in 
transactions of “United States coins or currency (or other monetary 
instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes).”77 
Accordingly, e-gold argued that because § 5330 applies only if 
§ 5313 is triggered, and § 5313 requires the handling of cash or 
coin, § 5330 also must require the handling of cash or coin.78 
The court was not persuaded, concluding that in fashioning 
§ 1960, Congress did not borrow from § 5330, but rather relied 
upon 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which makes it a federal crime to operate a 
gambling business in violation of state law.79 Looking at the 
legislative history80 of § 1955, the court found that Congress used 
the term “gambling business” to indicate that it sought to 
criminalize only large-scale illegal gambling operations: “Because 
Section 1960 was modeled from Section 1955, it can be inferred 
that Congress employed the term ‘business’ after ‘money 
transmitting’ in subsections (a) and (b)(1) of Section 1960 to 
indicate that Section 1960 was designed to tackle large-scale 
operations as opposed to small-scale or individual money 
transmitters.”81 
 
 75.  Id. at 88 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) (2006)). 
 76.  Id. at 87–88. 
 77.  31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2006). 
 78.  e-gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 87–88. 
 79.  Id. at 89. 
 80.  Anticipating that its reliance on the legislative history of § 1955—a 
statute not at issue in the case—might trouble some readers, the court 
preemptively defended its analysis:  
   The Court recognizes that reliance on the legislative history of a 
separate, albeit historically related, statute may not by itself eliminate 
all ambiguity from the phrase “money transmitting business” in Section 
1960 (assuming arguendo that any ambiguity existed at the outset). The 
structure of the statute as well as the relevant canons of statutory 
construction, however, guide the Court to the same conclusion. 
Id. at 90. 
 81.  Id. 
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The day before oral argument was held on defendants’ motion 
to dismiss,82 the government filed a superseding indictment that 
buttressed the large-scale nature of e-gold’s “money transmitting 
business” by alleging it maintained “a cadre of employees” and 
transferred “approximately $145,535,374.26” in funds.83 With these 
facts included in the indictment, the court concluded that e-gold 
constituted a “money transmitter” and a “business” and, thus, was 
also a “money transmitter business.”84 The court also held that even 
though e-gold had never handled currency or coin, it was still 
subject to the currency reporting requirements: “A money 
transmitting business is no less a transmitter of money just because 
it does not deal in currency. Rather, Section 5313 comes into force 
and will require a report if, when, and as the transmitter does 
engage in currency transactions.”85 In conclusion, the court was 
very clear in its view that handling cash is not the touchstone of 
being a money transmitting business under federal law. “The term 
‘money transmitting business’ as used in Section 5330 includes all 
financial institutions that fall outside of the conventional financial 
system (and that are not a ‘depository institution’), not just those 
that engage in cash transactions.”86 
The court’s decision, however, raises as many questions as it 
answers. If all entities could theoretically handle cash at some time 
in the future and thus be subject to § 5313, how could being 
subject to § 5313 possibly serve as a limiting factor in the 
application of § 1960(a)? What limitations, if any, are there on the 
application of money transmitter business laws? What does the 
expansion of money transmission from cash and currency to the 
more general term “funds” mean for virtual currencies? If e-gold—
an Internet-based system that allowed users to transfer among 
themselves electronic warehouse receipts for precious metals—was 
required to comply with federal money transmitter laws, then do 
other similar Internet systems also need to come into compliance? 
And if transactions in virtual currencies do constitute money 
transmission, does the court’s reliance on the legislative history of 
§ 1955 and its focus on large-scale versus small-scale enterprises 
 
 82.  Id. at 85 n.1. 
 83.  Id. at 90. 
 84.  Id. at 93. 
 85.  Id. at 95. 
 86.  Id. at 93. 
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mean that only major participants would fall under the regulations 
while small players and mere users would be free from government 
oversight? 
IV. FINCEN SPEAKS—INITIAL GUIDANCE ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
On March 18, 2013, FinCEN issued interpretive guidance 
clarifying the application of the BSA to virtual currencies 
(“FinCEN Guidance”).87 The guidance interprets FinCEN’s recently 
amended regulations governing money services businesses (MSBs), 
which includes currency exchanges and money transmitters 
(“MSB Rule”),88 and regulations governing providers and sellers of 
prepaid access (“Prepaid Access Rule”).89 The guidance attempts to 
clarify if and when a participant in a virtual currency scheme might 
be engaged in “money transmission,” which would require the 
entity to comply with the MSB Rule requirements to register, file 
reports, and maintain records. 
FinCEN began its analysis by distinguishing “real” currency 
from “virtual” currency. Real currency is the coin and paper money 
of the United States or another country that has status of legal 
tender in the country of issue.90 Virtual currency does not have 
legal tender status and thus is not currency. Some virtual currency, 
however, has an equivalent value in real currency or may be used as 
a “substitute” for real currency, and FinCEN deems this 
“convertible virtual currency.”91 FinCEN is not explicit on this 
point, but presumably a virtual currency, such as Bitcoin, that can 
be exchanged for real currency would constitute a convertible 
virtual currency. FinCEN concludes that the Prepaid Access Rule 
only applies to real currency and thus is not applicable to virtual 
 
 87.  FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2013-
G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, 
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), available at http://www.fincen 
.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.  
 88.  Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations 
Relating to Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,585 (July 21, 2011) 
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010, 1021–1022). 
 89.  Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions and Other Regulations 
Relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,403 (July 29, 2011) (codified at 31 
C.F.R. pt. 1010, 1022).  
 90.  FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 87, at 1 (citing 31 C.F.R. 
§ 1010.100(m) (2012)). 
 91.  Id.  
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/11
 
2014] REGULATING CRYPTOCURRENCIES 829 
currencies.92 Likewise, the regulations governing foreign exchange 
only cover currencies issued by other countries and thus do not 
apply to virtual currencies.93 
Because a convertible virtual currency may “substitute” for real 
currency, it may qualify as a form of money transmission. FinCEN 
defines money transmission as “the acceptance of currency, funds, 
or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and 
the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes 
for currency to another location or person by any means.”94 
Whether a particular entity is or is not a money transmitter is 
“a matter of facts and circumstances,” and the rules include a 
number of exemptions from the general rule.95 Under this 
guidance, a person who accepts a convertible virtual currency from 
one person and then transmits that convertible virtual currency to 
another person or location would be a money transmitter for 
FinCEN’s purposes.96 
In the next step of its analysis, FinCEN divides the participants 
in virtual currency arrangements into three categories: users, 
exchangers, and administrators.97 Users obtain virtual currency in 
order to purchase real or virtual goods and services.98 An exchanger 
is a person engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual 
currency for real or virtual currency.99 An administrator is a person 
engaged as a business in issuing and redeeming virtual currency.100 
FinCEN quickly concludes users are not MSBs because they do not 
transmit the value of funds to another person or location.101 “An 
administrator or exchanger that (1) accepts and transmits a 
convertible virtual currency or (2) buys or sells convertible virtual 
currency,” however, is a money transmitter unless an exemption 
applies.102 One exemption carves out an entity that accepts and 
transmits funds solely for the purpose of affecting a bona fide 
 
 92.  Id. at 5. 
 93.  Id. at 5–6. 
 94.  31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2012). 
 95.  Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii).  
 96.  Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i). 
 97.  FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 87, at 2. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 3.  
 100.  Id.  
 101.  See id. 
 102.  Id.  
17
Middlebrook and Hughes: Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
830 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
purchase or sale of currency—real or virtual—from the entity 
accepting the funds.103 In that case, the person is not acting as a 
money transmitter.104 
In an arrangement with a centralized administrator, the 
administrator will be a money transmitter to the “extent that it 
allows transfers of value between persons or from one location to 
another.”105 In addition, an intermediary exchange that accepts 
funds from a user and then transmits those funds to the user’s 
account with the administrator would also be engaged in money 
transmission.106 FinCEN acknowledges that the third-party 
exchange might appear to be conducting a bona fide purchase and 
thus entitled to an exemption, but notes that the safe harbor 
does not apply when the only service being provided is money 
transmission.107 
In a decentralized arrangement, a person who creates units of 
the virtual currency (a “miner” in Bitcoin parlance) and uses it to 
purchase real or virtual goods would not be a money transmitter.108 
FinCEN notes, however, “a person that creates units of convertible 
virtual currency and sells those units to another person for real 
currency or its equivalent is engaged in transmission to another 
location and is a money transmitter.”109 
Although the FinCEN Guidance is not a model of clarity, it 
appears that individuals who merely use a virtual currency to 
purchase goods or services are not deemed money transmitters and 
are not required to register as an MSB.110 Users who attempt to sell 
their virtual currency, however, may become money transmitters.111 
An administrator or an exchange that transmits convertible 
virtual currency to another person or location would be required to 
register as an MSB.112 FinCEN’s description of both an exchanger 
and an administrator contain the phrase “engaged as a business,” 
 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 4. 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  See id.  
 108.  Id. at 5. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
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which is not defined.113 The inclusion of this limiting descriptor 
seems to echo the large-scale-versus-small-scale dichotomy that the 
court in United States v. e-gold incorporated in its analysis of money 
transmission.114 It is unclear at what point an entity participating in 
the virtual currency scheme would be deemed to be acting as a 
business, and thus, it is difficult to advise such an entity as to when 
its obligation to register begins. The guidance appears to be 
designed to apply to Bitcoin and similar virtual currencies, 
although it is less clear whether it would apply to an in-game 
currency like Linden Dollars or to a merchant-sponsored program 
like Amazon Coins. 
At least three exchanges that traded bitcoin shut down shortly 
after the new guidance was issued.115 Patrick Murck, legal counsel 
for the Bitcoin Foundation, which promotes use of the virtual 
currency, said that rules “would be infeasible for many, if not most, 
members of the bitcoin community to comply with.”116 
The spring 2013 actions by the federal government prompted 
changes beyond bitcoin. For example, Linden Labs announced 
that it was modifying terms of service for Second Life to prohibit 
third-party currency exchanges and require all Linden Dollar 
transactions to take place on its own exchange.117 Treasury 
Undersecretary David Cohen stated, however, that virtual currency 
exchanges that comply with the law “have nothing to fear from 
Treasury.”118 
 
 113.  Id. at 2. 
 114.  See supra text accompanying footnotes 76–81. 
 115.  Jon Matonis, Fincen’s New Regulations Are Choking Bitcoin Entrepreneurs, AM. 
BANKER (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink 
/fincen-regulations-choking-bitcoin-entrepreneurs-1058606-1.html. 
 116.  Jeffrey Sparshott, Web Money Gets Laundering Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 
2013, at C1, available at LEXIS. 
 117.  Linden Lab, Updated Second Life Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE (May 7, 
2013, 11:55 AM), http://community.secondlife.com/t5/Featured-News/Updated 
-Second-Life-Terms-of-Service/ba-p/1996185.  
 118.  U.S.: Liberty Reserve Case No Comment on E-Currency Exchangers, UNITED 
PRESS INT’L (May 29, 2013), available at LEXIS. 
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V. ADDITIONAL FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS TAKE AN 
INTEREST IN VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
Perhaps inspired by FinCEN’s issuance of guidance, in 2013 
Congress and other federal agencies, along with some state 
regulators, began to show an interest in Bitcoin and virtual 
currencies. 
At the federal level, there was a suggestion that the Commodity 
Futures Trading Corporation should consider regulating virtual 
currencies as a form of commodity trading.119 The Government 
Accountability Office prepared a report for the Senate Committee 
on Finance, which concluded that transactions “using virtual 
currencies could produce taxable income in various ways” and 
recommended that the IRS issue guidance to tax payers of the “tax 
consequences of virtual economy transactions.”120 In August 2013, 
the Senate Homeland Security Committee sent letters to several 
federal agencies asking them to disclose their policies with regard 
to virtual currencies, explain how those policies were developed, 
and describe any future actions the agencies plan to take in this 
area.121 In addition, the House Committee on Appropriations noted 
that “Bitcoins and other forms of peer-to-peer digital currency are a 
potential means for criminal, terrorist, or other illegal 
organizations and individuals to illegally launder and transfer 
money.”122 The committee then directed the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to prepare a report “on the nature and scale of the 
risk posed by such ersatz currency, both in financing illegal 
enterprises and in undermining financial institutions.”123 
The Senate then moved into high gear in November 2013, 
holding two separate hearings on virtual currencies. First, the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a 
hearing entitled “Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and 
 
 119.  Tracey Alloway et al., U.S. Regulators Eye Bitcoin Supervision, FIN. TIMES 
(London) (May 6, 2013), available at LEXIS. 
 120.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND 
CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 10, 
15 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654620.pdf. 
 121.  Zachary Warmbrodt, Congress Starts Looking into Bitcoin, POLITICO.COM 
(Aug. 13, 2013, 12:08 AM) http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/congress 
-starts-looking-into-bitcoin-95464.html. 
 122.  H.R. REP. NO. 113-171, at 45 (2013). 
 123.  Id. 
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Promises of Virtual Currencies,” which featured witnesses from law 
enforcement and industry addressing the risks and potential 
rewards of virtual currencies.124 The Senate Banking Committee 
followed with its own hearing entitled “The Present and Future 
Impact of Virtual Currency,” which also featured the perspectives 
of law enforcement, state regulators, industry, and academics.125 
The hearings were widely viewed as positive developments for 
virtual currencies and were described by one reporter as 
“lovefests.”126 Law enforcement officials went on record describing 
Bitcoin as having a legitimate purpose and constituting a legal 
means of exchange.127 
State officials are also looking at virtual currency providers.128 
Several states have written to virtual currency exchanges and other 
businesses suggesting that if the companies do not come into 
compliance with state money transmitter rules, they will be shut 
down.129 In New York, the Department of Financial Services 
(NYDFS) opened an investigation into virtual currencies and 
subpoenaed twenty-two companies providing Bitcoin-related 
services130 as well as a number of venture capital firms that have 
 
 124.  Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual 
Currencies: Hearing on S.D. 342 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t 
Affairs, 113 Cong. (2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/beyond-silk 
-road-potential-risks-threats-and-promises-of-virtual-currencies. 
 125.  The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. & Int’l Trade & Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113 Cong. (2013), http://www.banking.senate.gov 
/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.LiveStream&Hearing_id=955322cc-d648 
-4a00-a41f-c23be8ff4cad. 
 126.  Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How Bitcoin Charmed Washington, WASH. POST. 
(Nov. 21, 2013), 2013 WL 29385308. 
 127.  Max Raskin, U.S. Agencies to Say Bitcoins Offer Legitimate Benefits, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2013-11-18/u-s-agencies-to-say-bitcoins-offer-legitimate-benefits.html; Ryan Tracy, 
Authorities See Worth of Bitcoin, WALL ST. J, Nov. 19, 2013, at C1, available at LEXIS. 
 128.  Robin Sidel & Andrew R. Johnson, ‘Virtual’ Currencies Draw State Scrutiny, 
WALL ST. J., June 1, 2013, at A1, available at LEXIS. 
 129.  Robin Sidel & Andrew R. Johnson, States Put Heat on Bitcoin: Letters Warn 
Exchanges to Follow Money-Transmission Laws or Be Closed Down, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
2013, at C1, available at LEXIS. 
 130.  Emily Spaven, New York State Financial Regulator Issues Subpoenas to 22 
Bitcoin Companies, COINDESK (Aug. 12, 2013, 5:55 PM), http://www.coindesk.com 
/new-york-state-financial-regulator-issues-subpoenas-to-bitcoin-companies. 
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invested in Bitcoin businesses.131 In a public statement, the 
NYDFS said, “If virtual currencies remain a virtual Wild West for 
narcotraffickers and other criminals, that would not only threaten 
our country’s national security, but also the very existence of the 
virtual currency industry as a legitimate business enterprise.”132 
NYDFS stated that based on its preliminary investigation, it was 
concerned that virtual currency exchangers may be engaging 
in money transmission (as defined under New York state law) 
without posting collateral, undergoing periodic safety and sound-
ness examinations, and complying133 with applicable anti-money-
laundering laws.134 Some state actions underscore how little officials 
understand cryptocurrency. For example, the California Depart-
ment of Financial Institutions sent a cease and desist letter to the 
Bitcoin Foundation, a nonprofit organization registered in Wash-
ington, D.C. with the mission of standardizing and promoting the 
Bitcoin protocol.135 The letter charged the foundation with 
engaging in money transmission in the state without a license, 
apparently in reaction to the group hosting a conference in the 
state.136 In response to all of the activity at the state level, a group of 
Bitcoin companies and advocates formed the Digital Asset Transfer 
Authority, a self-regulatory body for the industry, tasked with 
developing common risk management and compliance standards 
for members.137 
 
 131.  Bailey Reutzel, What NY’s Bitcoin Crackdown Means for Emerging Payments 
Companies, PAYMENTS SOURCE (Aug. 12, 2013, 3:13 PM), available at LEXIS. 
 132.  Memorandum from Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Servs., 
Notice of Inquiry on Virtual Currencies 1 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.dfs.ny.gov 
/about/press2013/memo1308121.pdf. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id. at 2. 
 135.  Matonis, supra note 4. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin Industry Leaders Launch DATA, A Self-Regulatory 
Body for Digital Currencies, COINDESK (July 30, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www 
.coindesk.com/bitcoin-industry-leaders-launch-data-a-self-regulatory-body. 
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VI. THE GOVERNMENT ACTS—ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST MT. 
GOX AND LIBERTY RESERVE 
A. Homeland Security Seizes Funds Held by Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox 
On May 14, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security 
obtained a seizure warrant directed to Dwolla, an Iowa-based 
Internet payments company, ordering the seizure and forfeiture of 
an account belonging to Mutum Sigillum, L.L.C.138 According to 
the federal agent’s affidavit filed with the warrant application, 
Mutum Sigillum is the U.S.-based subsidiary of Mt. Gox, the world’s 
largest Bitcoin exchange, which is based in Japan.139 The affidavit 
stated that a confidential informant residing in Maryland 
established an account at Dwolla that he used to fund an account at 
Mt. Gox and to purchase bitcoins.140 In addition, the informant also 
exchanged bitcoins for U.S. dollars, which were transmitted back to 
him through Mutum Sigillum and Dwolla accounts.141 The 
application asserted these transactions demonstrate that Mutum 
Sigillum is engaged in money transmission but has failed to register 
with FinCEN as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5330.142 The affidavit did 
not cite the FinCEN Guidance issued on March 18, 2013, but it is 
apparent from the document that the federal agent relied upon it. 
By failing to register as required by § 5330, the government 
asserted that Mt. Gox is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and subject 
to criminal penalties.143 In addition, the forfeiture of property 
involved in a transaction in violation of § 1960 is authorized by 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).144 The affidavit noted that Mutum Sigillum 
 
 138.  Seizure Warrant at 1, In re Seizure of the Contents of One 
Dwolla Account, No. 13-1162-SKG (D. Md. May 14, 2013), available at http:// 
cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-Gox-Dwolla-Warrant-5-14 
-13.pdf; see also Joe Mullin, Feds Seize Money from Dwolla Account Belonging to Top 
Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox, ARS TECHNICA (May 14, 2013, 5:55 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/feds-seize-money-from-top-bitcoin 
-exchange-mt-gox. 
 139.  Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant at 2, In re Seizure of the Contents of 
One Dwolla Account, No. 13-1162-SKG, available at http: //cdn.arstechnica.net/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-Gox-Dwolla-Warrant-5-14-13.pdf. 
 140.  Id. at 3. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 1. 
 144.  Id. at 4–5. 
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funds were also transmitted through an account at Wells Fargo and 
that a separate warrant was issued to seize funds in that account.145 
Although law enforcement executed warrants to seize the funds of 
Mt. Gox located in the United States, as of December 31, 2013, no 
indictments of Mt. Gox or its subsidiary Mutum Sigillum have been 
handed down. Perhaps in an effort to prevent criminal charges 
from being brought against it, Mt. Gox implemented a new policy 
requiring identity verification before it would perform currency 
deposits or withdrawals.146 According to press reports, a total of five 
million dollars was seized from Mt. Gox accounts.147 
B. Department of Justice Indicts Liberty Reserve for Money Laundering 
On May 28, 2013, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York unsealed a criminal indictment charging Liberty 
Reserve and seven of its principals and employees with operating 
an unlicensed money transmitter and engaging in money 
laundering.148 The indictment charges the defendants under 
18 U.S.C. § 1960 with conspiracy to operate and operating an 
unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5330 and its accompanying regulations.149 Defendants were also 
charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation 
 
 145.  Id. at 4; see also Brian Browdie, Bitcoin Exchange in U.S. Crosshairs Banked at 
Wells Fargo, AM. BANKER (May 16, 2013), 2013 WL 12019270 (noting that their 
Wells Fargo account had been seized). 
 146.  Press Release, Mt. Gox Co., Statement Regarding Account Verifications 
(May 30, 2013), https://mtgox.com/press_release_20130530.html. For more 
information about these new procedures see Andy Greenberg, Not So 
Anonymous: Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox Tightens Identity Requirements, FORBES (May 30, 
2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/30/not 
-so-anonymous-bitcoin-exchange-mt-gox-tightens-identity-requirement.  
 147.  Greg Schvey, Additional $2.1M Seized from Mt. Gox Accounts—Now Over 
$5M Total, GENESIS BLOCK (Aug. 22, 2013), http://thegenesisblock.com/warrant 
-for-mt-gox-wells-fargo-accounts-shows-additional-2-1m-seized. 
 148.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney 
Announces Charges Against Liberty Reserve, One of World’s Largest Digital 
Currency Companies, and Seven of Its Principals and Employees for Allegedly 
Running a $6 Billion Money Laundering Scheme (May 28, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13/LibertyReservePR.php.  
 149.  Indictment ¶¶ 33–42, United States v. Liberty Reserve, No. 
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of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).150 Liberty 
Reserve is alleged to have been a “financial hub of the cyber-crime 
world” facilitating identity theft, credit card fraud, computer 
hacking, child pornography, and drug trafficking.151 It had 200,000 
users in the United States and processed over twelve million 
transactions a year with a value of more than $1.4 billion.152 
Criminals were drawn to Liberty Reserve because it did not require 
users to validate their identity with the service and criminals could 
create accounts under false names such as “Russian Hackers.”153 
The government alleges that Liberty Reserve, in an effort to add an 
additional layer of anonymity, did not permit users to transmit 
funds directly to Liberty Reserve but instead required them to 
make deposits and withdrawals through third-party exchanges.154 
These exchangers were themselves unlicensed money transmitters 
operating without government oversight from Malaysia, Russia, 
Nigeria, and Vietnam.155 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), the government sought 
forfeiture of “at least $6 billion” held in accounts in Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Russia, Hong Kong, China, Morocco, Spain, Latvia, 
Australia, and one account at SunTrust Bank in the United 
States.156 In a declaration filed in support of the indictment, a 
Secret Service agent stated that the investigation included 
execution of “one of the first-ever ‘cloud’-based search warrants, 
directed to a service provider used to process Liberty Reserve’s 
Internet traffic.”157 The government also sought an injunction 
preventing Amazon Web Services from providing services to 
support Liberty Reserve’s web site.158 
 
 150.  Id. ¶¶ 30–32. 
 151.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 152.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 153.  Id. ¶¶ 14, 19. 
 154.  Id. ¶ 16.  
 155.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 156.  Id. ¶ 43. 
 157.  Declaration of Special Agent [] in Support of Ex Parte Application 
for Post-Indictment Restraining Order, Seizure Warrant and Injunction 
Exhibit B, ¶ 9, United States v. Liberty Reserve, No. 13-CR-368 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13 
/LibertyReservePR/Liberty%20Reserve,%20et%20al.%20Redacted%20AUSA%20
Appln%20with%20exhibits.pdf. 
 158.  Id. ¶ 74. 
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On the same day that indictment was unsealed, FinCEN issued 
a notice of proposed rulemaking to declare Liberty Reserve an 
institution of primary money laundering concern under section 
311 of the Patriot Act.159 The designation would prohibit U.S. 
financial institutions from maintaining correspondent relationships 
with foreign banks that do business with Liberty Reserve.160 The 
measure “would effectively cut off Liberty Reserve from the U.S. 
financial system.”161 
Although the Mt. Gox forfeiture order and the e-gold 
and Liberty Reserve criminal indictments are quite different on 
a number of levels, all three enforce regulatory business require-
ments through a criminal process and rely on the often-criticized 
penalty 162 of asset forfeiture. 
While this may be a convenient and effective way for law 
enforcement to deal with money launderers, it has significant 
collateral effect on small companies and start-ups who wish to 
operate within the confines of the law but lack the resources or the 
expertise to navigate such tricky regulatory waters. Establishing 
appropriate compliance obligations without stifling innovation in 
emerging payments technology is always a concern. With regard to 
virtual currencies, it remains to be seen whether the government 
has found the proper balance.163 
VII. FUTURE PARADIGMS FOR THE REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 
Cryptocurrencies face efforts to regulate their existence and 
the manner in which they are transferred and redeemed by both 
state and federal authorities in the United States as well as by 
foreign governments.164 In order for future regulation to be 
 
 159.  Imposition of Special Measure Against Liberty Reserve S.A. as a Financial 
Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 34,008 (proposed 
June 6, 2013) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010). 
 160.  Id. at 30,009–10. 
 161.  Chris Cumming, Fincen Seeks to Deputize Banks in $6B Laundering Case, AM. 
BANKER (May 29, 2013), 2013 WLNR 13105120.  
 162.  See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, at 48, available 
at 2013 WLNR 20611866.  
 163.  For a discussion of the potential “chilling effect” of California’s money 
transmitter statute, see Bryans, supra note 6 (manuscript at 34–35). 
 164.  See Deepak Tiwari, Bitcoin Dealers Realize a Regulated Market Is Better for 
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successful and foster a new monetary technology that appropriately 
weighs both the needs of citizens and governments, a number of 
paradigmatic questions will require answers. In this part of the 
article, we raise those questions that have occurred to us that we 
feel deserve serious thought and exploration by industry 
participants, regulators, and legislators. We also take the liberty of 
suggesting for some of these questions the direction in which we 
think the analysis should advance. We make no claim, however, to 
have thought of all of the possible questions or to have answers to 
the majority of them. We offer these thoughts in the spirit of 
fostering a robust debate on the future of cryptocurrencies. 
What Is Cryptocurrency? 
Proponents can’t easily explain what a cryptocurrency is. If you 
can’t explain what you are and how you fit into the current legal 
and regulatory scheme, you are at the mercy of the ignorant. The 
“what this is” answer needs to address not just things like “is it 
money transmission?” but more mundane yet important questions 
like “where is a bitcoin located?” and “where and when does a 
transaction take place?” 
Cryptocurrency supporters should address whether crypto-
currency is a currency/store of value or a payment system or a 
hybrid of both. They should also be prepared to explain if and 
when these products should be treated like securities or 
commodities or prepaid access. 
It is also important for proponents to separate the different 
“brands” of cryptocurrency (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ripple, etc.) from 
each other and the larger concept of a cryptographically-secured 
value transfer system. Given that the different protocols will likely 
develop along divergent pathways, some choosing to emphasize 
certain attributes (like anonymity), the industry is going to have to 
decide how it wishes to treat players who take a minority position. It 
may be that certain protocols will evolve to support different 
business models, introducing changes so significant that the 
 
-growth-and-development-14540 (reporting on a meeting between U.K. policy 
makers and Bitcoin dealers that recently took place at Downing Street at which the 
participants concluded that the U.K. government should introduce regulation for 
bitcoins).  
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modified product should be treated as a different species subject to 
a different regulatory scheme. 
What Is the Proper Regulatory Scheme for Cryptocurrency? 
Among the most probable possibilities are: 
 None. Cryptocurrency will not be regulated. We think this 
option has no chance of being adopted. 
  Unique cryptocurrency regulatory scheme. While this could be 
the ideal solution, this currently seems an unlikely outcome. 
The law has a tendency to address new products and 
technologies by analogizing to existing regulatory schemes. 
We suggest that this outcome is not wholly impossible, 
however, and note that with its e-money directive, the 
European Union demonstrated that if legislators are willing to 
make hard policy choices, they can craft a regulatory scheme 
uniquely tailored to a new technology.165 
  Cryptocurrency as money transmission. This seems to be the 
current direction based on recent actions by FinCEN and the 
states. It is unclear that this route is optimal, but for those 
entities that can comply with federal and state money 
transmitter requirements, this option provides a safe haven. 
One example of a payments innovator that used this option to 
enormous benefit is PayPal. 
  Cryptocurrency as bank product. Banks are currently standing 
on the sidelines as other entities develop and market 
cryptocurrency. This might change, however, especially if the 
innovators are successful in navigating the regulatory waters 
and at turning a profit. We believe that in the future, banks 
may become involved in the cryptocurrency market, which 
would have interesting regulatory implications. Banks are 
exempt from state money transmitter laws and registration 
requirements. Banks, however, have come under heavy 
pressure to police their business partners that offer innovative 
products.166 Given recent communications that banks and 
other depository institutions have received about facilitating 
providers of certain consumer payments, banks may well take a 
 
 165.  Council Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L267) 7, 7 (EC). 
 166.  See Memorandum from Benjamin M. Lawsky, supra note 132. 
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“wait-and-see” attitude before deciding how or how much to 
participate in or with cryptocurrencies. If cryptocurrency 
establishes itself more firmly in the future, then banks are 
likely to become players by buying participants. This was the 
strategy that several banks used with prepaid cards. 
  Cryptocurrency as multiple activities. We could see 
cryptocurrency regulation varying significantly based on the 
role taken by participants. Administrators and exchanges, for 
example, might be subjected to the full panoply of state and 
federal money transmitter rules, while an individual merely 
using a cryptocurrency to make a purchase would remain 
unregulated.167 One can see the beginnings of such an 
approach in the FinCEN Guidance. 
Are Cryptocurrencies Intended to Provide Anonymous Transactions? 
A business model that is predicated on providing anonymity is 
going to face a very high level of scrutiny. Entities that provide 
payment services designed to provide anonymity are going to find 
themselves cut off from the rest of the financial system, making it 
difficult if not impossible for users to engage the service. Federal 
regulators have already used section 311 of the Patriot Act to isolate 
and effectively close Liberty Reserve.168 It’s important to understand 
that anonymity is not binary, meaning that the choice isn’t between 
absolute anonymity and completely open transactions. The 
questions are (1) what degree of anonymity is provided, (2) what is 
the process for breaking anonymity, and (3) who controls the 
process. An important question will be whether current law that 
prevents financial institutions from providing customer records to 
federal agencies except in certain limited circumstances will be 
extended to cover newer technology like cryptocurrency that is not 
offered by a traditional financial institution.169 
 
 167.  For discussion of this “regulation-in-part” concept, as well as one view of 
the optimal manner of regulating exchanges, see Bryans, supra note 6 (manuscript 
at 34–35). 
 168.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 169.  See provisions prohibiting government access to financial records 
included in the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401−3422 (2012). For 
an analysis of the application of the Right to Financial Privacy Act to prepaid 
cards, see Stephen T. Middlebrook, What’s in Your Wallet? Could It Be the Department 
of Homeland Security?, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2013, at 1. 
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One solution, already used in the prepaid industry, is to allow 
anonymous users and transactions with certain lower velocity limits 
and to require customer identification when dollar volumes (or 
rather, coin volumes) exceed a certain threshold. 
It is also important to note that anonymity is incongruous with 
consumer protections. 
Will Future Regulation Be Driven by Payments Policy Concerns or Law 
Enforcement Demands? 
The 2013 FinCEN Guidance came out after the Mt. Gox and 
Liberty Reserve investigations were underway, but before public law 
enforcement actions were taken. It’s tempting to ask whether 
FinCEN was pressured by law enforcement to issue the 
guidance and whether FinCEN’s analysis was influenced by law 
enforcement’s immediate needs. We have no answers to these 
questions. 
Assuming Anonymity Is Resolved, What Is the Appropriate Level of 
Consumer Protection for Cryptocurrency Users? 
It appears that users of e-gold, Liberty Reserve, and perhaps 
Mt. Gox have lost funds entrusted with those providers. What 
recourse should users, and particularly consumers, have in such 
situations? The current state of regulatory uncertainty imperils not 
just cryptocurrency businesses and their investors, but also their 
users. Although the finality of transactions that cannot be disputed 
or reversed may appeal to sellers on the Silk Road,170 ordinary, law-
abiding individuals eventually will expect the same kinds of 
protections from unauthorized or fraudulent transactions they 
receive on credit and debit cards. 
To demonstrate the prospective dollar value of transactions 
that might arise on Bitcoin or another cryptocurrency that ordinary 
 
 170.  For a useful discussion on finality of payments, see Katy Jacob & Kristin E. 
Wells, Evaluating the Potential for Immediate Funds Transfer for General-Purpose 
Payments in the United States, CHI. FED. LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank, Chi., Ill.) Nov. 
2011, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago 
_fed_letter/2011/cflnovember2011_292a.pdf (identifying “immediate funds 
transfer” (IFT) as bank-to-bank transfers “with no or minimal delay in receiver’s 
receipt and use of funds” and citing the growing availability of IFT abroad). For 
discussion of the use of bitcoins in Silk Road transactions, see Ball, supra note 23.  
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individuals would care about, we cite the fact that bitcoins are 
touted as a cost-effective alternative for individuals wanting to make 
remittance payments to their home countries.171 Should (does?) the 
federal Remittance Transfer Rule172 apply to cryptocurrency 
transactions? 
Which Government Will Have Jurisdiction over Cryptocurrencies for 
Purposes Such as Escheat? 
Assuming that the “location” of a bitcoin is resolved, regulators 
will have to address abandoned property issues. This might strike 
readers as a silly concern, but there are billions of dollars at stake 
and states will fight to escheat abandoned bitcoins or other 
cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies.173 
Looking at other regulatory paradigms might help us predict 
how federal, state, and foreign governments might regulate 
cryptocurrencies. In particular, reviewing past regulatory 
approaches for the following products might prove instructive: 
 online gaming;174 
 
 171.  Joshua Brustein, Will Migrant Workers Drive Bitcoin’s Mundane Future?, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-
08/will-migrant-workers-drive-bitcoins-mundane-future. 
 172.  12 C.F.R. pt. 1005 (2012). 
 173.  For decisions involving the escheat of funds in gift cards, see N.J. Retail 
Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 396–98 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming 
the district court’s injunction against a “place of purchase” presumption for its 
jurisdictional claim to escheat priority); Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. 
Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (D.N.J. 2010). For discussions of these 
decisions, see Sarah Jane Hughes, L’Embarras du Choix: A Year of Developments in the 
Laws Affecting Remittance Transfers, Credit Cards, and Certain Prepaid Cards, 68 BUS. 
LAW. 233, 234, 241–42 (2012); Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, 
Developments in the Laws Governing Electronic Payments Made Through Gift Cards, Debit 
and Prepaid Cards, Credit Cards, and Direct Deposits of Federal Benefits, 66 BUS. LAW. 
159, 159 (2010). For an extensive analysis of state escheat laws and their 
application to e-payments, see Anita Ramasastry, State Escheat Statutes and Possible 
Treatment of Stored Value, Electronic Currency, and Other New Payment Mechanisms, 
57 BUS. LAW. 475, 475 (2001).  
 174. In particular, we note that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367, defines a “financial transaction provider” as  
a creditor, credit card issuer, financial institution, operator of a 
terminal at which an electronic fund transfer may be initiated, money 
transmitting business, or international, national, regional, or local 
payment network utilized to effect a credit transaction, electronic fund 
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  electronic financial services that can be provided only by banks 
because they involve “deposits” that are subject to core 
banking regulations; 
  electronic financial services not provided by banks and that 
state and federal regulators would deem to be “money 
transmission” under their respective statutes;175 
  electronic financial services that do not qualify as money 
transmissions or as “deposits” under the definition in the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act;176 and 
  forms of fractional-value “notes”—often called “shinplasters”—
subject to the Stamp Payments Act of 1862 and thus, 
prohibited in the United States.177 
Other reasons why governments—national governments and, 
in the United States, state governments—regulate media of 
exchange relate to ancient concerns that apply just as much to 
cryptocurrencies as they did to the earlier 1990s styles of “virtual 
currencies.”178 These concerns include widely found protections 
such as (1) safe storage of value; (2) redemption on predictable 
terms without interruptions such as those experienced by users of 
the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange in 2013; (3) protections against 
counterfeits or re-use or replications of the same unique “tokens” 
 
transfer, stored value product transaction, or money transmitting 
service, or a participant in such network, or other participant in a 
designated payment system. 
Id. § 5362(4). The gist of the Act is to make payments processing illegal if the law 
of the state in which the gambling occurred makes the wager or bet illegal. Id. 
§ 5363.  
 175.  See supra text accompanying notes 74–86. 
 176.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l) (2012). 
 177.  See 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006). The constitutionality of the Stamp Payments 
Act (which only applies to values under one dollar) and of the National Currency 
Act of 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665 (authorizing issuance of “greenbacks” not 
backed by specie), replaced by National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), were tested in a series of 
United States Supreme Court decisions beginning shortly after the Civil War 
ended, including United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366 (1877) (reviewing claim of 
violation of the Stamp Payments Act, but holding act was not violated because the 
scrip was explicitly only redeemable in goods, and was not intended to circulate as 
money). 
 178.  For a discussion of early e-payments products, see Sarah Jane Hughes, 
A Call for International Legal Standards for Emerging Retail Electronic Payment Systems, 
15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197, 206–15 (1996) (describing products offered by First 
Virtual Holdings, Inc., DigiCash BV, and Mondex, among others).  
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that coins, paper currency, and even “electronic instruments” 
should have; and (4) seigniorage. Depending on the nature of the 
transaction, the federal government and the states have had widely 
varying regulations governing error resolution, including on the 
reversibility of payments, for users of credit and debit cards, payroll 
cards, checks, and even funds transfers. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
No cryptocurrency issuer, exchanger, or user should have 
expected that the government of the United States—or any other 
government for that matter—would allow any significant storage of 
value in its “currency” without deciding to regulate the issuer or 
central exchange involved in some manner. 
Why? Because that is what governments have been doing to 
protect both trade and their own seigniorage rights for at least the 
past 500 years. By 1605, for example, the English courts were 
already convinced of the Crown’s right to control what constituted 
“legal tender” and who could issue “legal tender.”179 The federal 
government’s exclusive right to issue “coins” is expressed in the 
U.S. Constitution.180 When Congress enacted the Stamp Payments 
Act of 1862,181 the National Currency Act of 1863,182 and then the 
National Bank Act of 1864,183 it expressed its conviction that it 
alone had authority to declare what qualifies as “legal tender.” 
 
 179.  See The Case of Mixed Money, [1605] 80 Eng. Rep. 507 (P.C.) 
(upholding the right of Elizabeth I of England to devalue the currency, as she had 
in 1601, even if it caused great suffering among the people of Ireland), translated 
in JOHN DAVIES, A REPORT OF CASES AND MATTERS IN LAW: RESOLVED AND ADJUDGED 
IN THE KING’S COURTS IN IRELAND [1604–1612], at 48 (1762). A key sentence from 
the opinion in that case proclaimed: “That it appertaineth only to the [K]ing of 
England, to make or coin money within his dominions; [King’s prerogative in 
making or coining money.]” Id. at 51. The court also announced its conviction 
that there were three attributes of “money” and “legal tender” that distinguished 
them: the prince, the stamp, and the value. Id. at 52.  
 180.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5 (“To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, 
and of foreign Coin . . . .”).  
 181.  Stamp Payments Act of 1862, ch. 196, § 2, 12 Stat. 592 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 336 (2012)).  
 182.  National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665, replaced by 
National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
 183.  National Bank Act, § 1, 13 Stat. 99. 
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The Supreme Court agreed with Congress in a series of famous 
decisions beginning shortly after the National Bank Act was 
enacted.184 In Veazie Bank v. Fenno,185 the Supreme Court upheld 
Congress’s imposition of a tax of ten percent imposed on state and 
national banks paying out “notes” of individuals or state banks used 
for circulation, likening this tax to the payment of duties. The 
Court specifically recited a number of facts about the manner in 
which Congress has taken charge of legal tender, including 
(1) denying the quality of legal tender to foreign coins, 
(2) providing a law against counterfeits and base coin on the 
community, (3) restraining the issue of notes not issued under its 
own authority, and (4) observing that without the power to control 
these aspects of legal tender, Congress’s “attempts to secure a 
sound and uniform currency for the country must be futile.”186 
The Supreme Court was even more forceful in holding the 
1860s “legal tender” acts constitutional, both as to contracts 
entered into before and after their passage.187 The Court’s opinion 
discussed the powers of the sovereign and noted that the Court 
would have to reverse course for its growing body of canons of 
 
 184.  See United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366 (1877) (reviewing claim of 
violation of the Stamp Payments Act (which only prohibits issuance of notes with 
values under one dollar), but holding that the act was not violated because the 
scrip was explicitly only redeemable in goods and was not intended to circulate as 
money); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 549–55 (1870), abrogated by Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the legal tender acts as to contracts entered 
into both after and before their enactment, with much interesting discussion of 
the powers of the sovereign over currency and coinage, and holding the National 
Currency Act of February 25, 1863 to be valid to pay most government 
obligations). 
 185.  Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869). 
 186.  Id. at 549 (describing the federal government’s rights under the 
Constitution, the claim of direct but non-apportioned taxation, and the ninth 
section of the Act of July 13, 1866 that imposed a ten percent tax on notes issued 
by banking associations chartered by the states). For additional discussion of that 
decision, see Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, 
and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111 (2012). 
 187.  Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 549–55 (holding that “greenbacks” issued 
under the authority of the National Currency Act of February 25, 1863 were valid 
to pay most government obligations).  
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statutory construction if it did not uphold Congress’s acts 
concerning legal tender.188 
A government’s interests are no less when one considers the 
authority to tax transactions and profits189 and to impose duties 
on foreign transactions.190 Thus, following its announcement that 
it would not require Bitcoin exchanges to register as a “money 
service” or “money transmitter” in the United Kingdom, Her 
Majesty’s representatives still warned Bitcoin users about paying 
attention to the tax implications of their Bitcoin transactions.191 
Those representatives, however, predicted that regulation “will 
definitely come into play” and “so it is in the best interests of 
businesses that think they are transacting as a money services 
business to still keep anti-money laundering and know-your-
customer practices in play so they’re prepared for when 
HMRC does come knocking.”192 Soon afterwards, Her Majesty’s 
representatives did an about-face and, following a meeting with 
Bitcoin U.K. representatives, announced their intention to issue 
regulations.193 
Considering the different possible regulatory paradigms and 
the questions we raised in Part VII of this article, we find ample 
evidence of governments’ interests in regulating cryptocurrencies 
in one fashion or another and of several possible ways to determine 
which of the competing federal-versus-state and payments-versus-
securities-versus-commodities paradigms should be considered. 
Even among the paradigms that apply to different payments 
systems, options abound. The participants in transactions of this 
type have long had regulations governing their rights and have 
 
 188.  Id. at 491–96. 
 189.  For an interesting discussion of the authority to tax and the reasons for 
exercising that authority, see Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 
112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38 (2013).  
 190.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 191.  See Emily Spaven, HMRC: UK Bitcoin Exchanges Don’t Have to Register 
Under Money Laundering Regulations, COINDESK (July 8, 2013, 2:39 PM), 
http://www.coindesk.com/hmrc-uk-bitcoin-exchanges-dont-have-to-register-
under-money-laundering-regulations/ (explaining that although there is “no 
specific regulation relating to digital currency” in the U.K., “standard tax rules 
apply” and, thus, “those who receive bitcoin in return for goods and services will 
have to pay tax on any profits they make”).  
 192.  Id.  
 193.  Tiwari, supra note 164.  
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had, in greater and lesser degrees, government regulation of 
depositories and exchange/payment systems rules. Some of these 
regulations grew out of informal self-regulation, at least as the 
subjects suitable for resolution by private law or system rules—as 
opposed to public law—are concerned. 
The federal government’s action against e-gold and its 2013 
regulatory guidance and law enforcement actions against Liberty 
Reserve and Mt. Gox persuade us that the government will exercise 
regulatory authority over cryptocurrencies and other virtual 
currencies to some extent. 
Despite the tendency of new Internet-based entrants to 
imagine themselves to be entitled to exist and operate without 
regulations, a kind of unregulated Wild West attitude, the old-
fashioned notions of why we regulate payments and value-storage 
media that we discuss in this article suggest to us that regulation 
will happen, and that its challenges will be similar to those faced 
since kings and princes first issued coins and then issued other 
indicia of stored value such as paper “money” that qualified for use 
as “legal tender.” 
The idea that governments issue “money” and declare what 
qualifies as “legal tender” is an ancient notion. The history of 
regulating money and legal tender suggests that it is not likely that 
governments will surrender their privileges to regulate 
cryptocurrency issuers, exchanges, administrators, or users. The 
real questions are which paradigm(s) governments will use, how 
much enforcement energy they will spend on regulating 
cryptocurrencies, and whether and how they will compete with 
each other to offer regulatory schemes that do not send 




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/11
